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Abstract 
Many empirical studies have shown that preferences are reference-dependent, implying loss aversion. 
Because reference-dependence is a relatively new concept, there exists little theory on it. The theories that 
are available generally take the reference point as given and then impose the traditional assumptions such 
as completeness of preferences. Reference-dependence raises, however, new problems that do not occur in 
reference-independent theories. This paper argues that in the empirically realistic case where the reference 
point is always an element of the decision maker’s opportunity set, reference-dependent preferences are, 
according to the principles of revealed preference, necessarily incomplete. A new model of decision under 
uncertainty is presented that extends prospect theory to cover this case. The paper also gives preference 
foundations for two special cases: one in which utility is decomposed into a normative and a 
psychological component and one in which loss aversion is constant. The latter case has frequently been 
used in empirical research and in applied decision analysis.  
 
 
Subject classifications: Decision analysis: theory. Utility/preference: theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional economic and operational models assume that agents behave according to expected utility. 
Evidence abounds, however, that people systematically violate expected utility. An important cause of 
deviations from expected utility is that preferences are reference-dependent. People do not evaluate 
outcomes as absolute amounts, as expected utility assumes, but as gains and losses relative to a reference 
point and are more sensitive to losses than to gains.  Reference-dependence is empirically well-established 
(e.g. Kahneman et al. 1990, Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Barberis et al. 2001) and it is an important 
factor in explaining people’s attitudes towards risk (Rabin 2000). There is also growing evidence that 
reference-dependence can explain a variety of field data (Hardie et al. 1993, Benartzi and Thaler 1995, 
Camerer et al. 1997, Camerer 2000, Pennings and Smidts 2003). A formal theory of reference-dependence 
is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992), currently the main 
descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty.  
Because reference-dependence is a relatively new concept, there exists little theory on it. The theories 
that exist generally take the reference point as fixed and certain and then apply the traditional axioms of 
decision theory, such as completeness of preferences (Luce and Fishburn 1991, Tversky and Kahneman 
1992, Wakker and Tversky 1993, Zank 2001, Köbberling and Wakker 2003). Important advancements 
were made by Sugden (2003), who allowed that the reference point could be uncertain, and by Schmidt 
(2003), who analyzed the impact of shifts in the reference point. As was formally shown by Wakker 
(2005, Observation 4.4 and Theorem 4.5), reference-dependence can only explain the commonly observed 
deviations from expected utility when the reference point shifts across decisions. See, for example, 
Popescu and Wu (forthcoming) for an application of shifting reference points in dynamic pricing. Schmidt 
(2003) and Sugden (2003) also imposed all the traditional assumptions of decision theory, in particular 
completeness of preferences. 
Reference-dependence raises new problems that are not present in reference-independent theories. 
This paper focuses on one of these problems, that reference-dependence makes the assumption of 
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complete preferences less plausible and often requires incompleteness of preferences. As will be explained 
below, this is a consequence of the fact that in many decision situations, the reference point is always one 
of the options that are available to the decision maker. This often happens because the status quo is taken 
as the reference point and retention of the status quo is always possible. Consider the example of an 
investor who contemplates buying stocks. Then the status quo, i.e., buying no stocks, is always one of the 
available options. If the status quo is not readily available, which happens for instance in decisions 
between uncertain medical treatments involving unknown health states, people often take one of the 
alternatives as their reference point.  
For example, Robinson, Loomes, and Jones-Lee (2001) asked people to compare the certainty of 
impaired health with a risky treatment offering a chance p of an improvement in health and a chance 1−p 
of a deterioration in health. They observed that people took the certain health state as their reference point 
and evaluated the outcomes of the treatment as gains and losses relative to this reference point. A similar 
finding for monetary outcomes was reported by Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) who observed that in a 
choice between a sure monetary amount and a risky prospect people took the sure amount as their 
reference point and evaluated the outcomes of the prospect as deviations from this reference point. Further 
empirical evidence of people taking one of the available options as their reference point is in  Johnson and 
Schkade (1989), Stalmeier and Bezembinder (1999), Morrison (2000), Robinson et al. (2001), Bleichrodt 
et al. (2001), and van Osch et al. (2004). Let me emphasize here that my point is not that in every decision 
situation the reference point will always be in the decision maker’s opportunity set. I only claim that there 
are decision situations of considerable interest where this is the case and, hence, this issue is worth 
exploring. 
If the reference point always belongs to the decision maker’s opportunity set, then reference-
dependent preferences must be incomplete. This follows from the principles of revealed preference, the 
basic primitive of economics and decision theory, which require that preferences are derived from 
observable choices. To see this point assume that three acts f, g, and r all belong to the decision maker’s 
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opportunity set and that the reference point r is better than both f and g. For instance, consider a patient 
who has to make a choice between his current treatment, his reference point, or adopting one of two new 
treatments f and g. Suppose that there are two possible states of nature the probabilities of which are 
unknown, either the patient has disease A or disease B. Suppose further that the reference treatment r 
gives 10 additional years of life if the patient turns out to have disease A and 15 additinal years of life if 
he turns out to have disease B. For treatment f these numbers are 8 if A and 12 if B and for treatment g 
they are 10 if A and 9 if B. Then the decision maker will always choose r over f and g, so that we can 
never observe a choice between f and g from reference point r, and revealed preference is incomplete 
regarding f,g given reference point r. Assuming completeness of reference-dependent preferences in such 
a case would require a resort to introspective preferences not based on observable choice and would 
deviate from the revealed preference paradigm. Some authors distinguish between revealed and 
psychological preferences (e.g. Danan 2003, Mandler 2005). I do not follow this approach. This paper 
takes choice as the basic primitive and derives preferences directly from binary choice, as is common in 
economics and decision theory. 
Because all existing characterizations of prospect theory assume complete preferences, they 
cannot handle this empirically important situation and extensions of prospect theory that allow for 
incomplete preferences are required. The purpose of this paper is to present such extensions. The paper 
makes use of some representation results for incomplete reference-dependent preferences that were 
derived in Bleichrodt (2005). It starts by giving a preference foundation for a general model of incomplete 
reference-dependent preferences. As in Sugden (2003), in this model the reference point can be any act, 
certain or uncertain. As in Schmidt (2003), the reference point can shift across decision contexts.  
Then two special cases will be considered. In the first model, utility is decomposed into two 
terms: a basic utility, which can be interpreted as the normative component of utility or the standard 
economic concept of utility and a function reflecting the impact of additional psychological factors on 
utility, in particular loss aversion. While loss aversion is general in the first special case, in the second 
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model it is captured by a single parameter. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) referred to this case as constant 
loss aversion. Constant loss aversion is commonly assumed in empirical research on reference-
dependence and in applications of prospect theory. 
There are two ways in which the results of this paper can be interpreted. One interpretation is that 
the paper derives representations for incomplete preferences on a full Cartesian product. An alternative 
interpretation is that the paper derives representations of binary preferences on a subset of a Cartesian 
product, being a subset where the preference relation is complete. A common misunderstanding in the 
literature is that representation theory on subsets of Cartesian products does not differ from  representation 
theory on full Cartesian products. This is not so, and several authors have pointed out that the restriction 
of representation theorems to subsets of Cartesian products poses many extra complications (Falmagne 
1981, Fishburn 1970, p.74, Krantz et al. 1971, p.276, Shapiro 1979, and Wakker 1989, Remark III.7.8). 
Wakker (1993a) cited common misunderstandings about the nontrivial nature of extensions to subsets 
from economics, psychology, operations research, and functional equations and, in a complex analysis, 
demonstrated that even for well-behaved subsets, connected with full-dimensional interior, the extra 
complexities are already large. 
 The focus of this paper is on reference-dependence and it does not consider nonadditive decision 
weighting, the other deviation from expected utility modeled by prospect theory. Consequently, the paper 
should not be interpreted as an attempt to explain all observed regularities in decision under uncertainty. 
Incorporating nonadditive decision weighting into the models studied in this paper would substantially 
complicate the already long and complex proofs. Schmidt et al. (2005) proposed an extension of Sugden’s 
(2003) model to incorporate nonadditive decision weighting, but gave no preference foundations. 
 Several studies besides Schmidt (2003), Sugden (2003), and Schmidt et al. (2005) have recently 
proposed new theories of reference-dependence in decision under uncertainty. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) 
studied cases where status quo bias is rational and were mainly concerned with riskless choice. They also 
considered incompleteness of preferences, but in their paper status quo bias follows from indecisiveness of 
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the decision maker. The present paper gives another reason why studying incompleteness of preference 
relations is important: in many decision contexts incompleteness follows from reference-dependence. 
Reference-dependence requires a different form of incompleteness than studied by Masatlioglu and Ok 
and, consequently, their paper is rather different from mine. Sagi (2006) explored the impact of imposing 
a “no-regret condition” on reference-dependent preferences and suggested a model that satisfies this 
condition. Apesteguia and Ballester (2006) studied decisions where the reference point, if it exists, is an 
element of the decision maker’s choice set, as opposed to an element of the opportunity set which is 
considered here, and also allowed for specific shifts in the reference point. They did not consider 
incompleteness of preferences though and their analysis is restricted to riskless choice. Closer to the 
present paper is Köszegi and Rabin (forthcoming), who proposed a model that bears some resemblance to 
the model characterized in Section 4, but did not give preference foundations.  
Köszegi and Rabin (forthcoming) also presented a theory of how reference points are formed. 
Like previous studies that gave preference foundations for prospect theory, I will assume that the 
reference point is exogenously given. That said, the tools of this paper may also prove useful in giving 
preference foundations for models with endogenous reference points because such models will most likely 
entail assuming a type of incompleteness of preferences that resembles the type of incompleteness 
modeled in this paper. To illustrate, if people behave as suggested by Hershey and Schoemaker (1985), 
they will take €100 as their reference point in a comparison between €100 for sure and a prospect giving 
€200 with probability p and nothing otherwise. Consequently, a preference between €100 and €200 with 
probability p judged from any other reference point than €100 cannot be observed.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives notation and states the main assumptions. Section 
3 gives a preference foundation for the general reference-dependent utility model with incomplete 
preferences. Section 4 characterizes the special case in which utility is decomposed into a normative and a 
psychological component. Section 5 characterizes constant loss aversion. Section 6 concludes. All proofs 
are in the appendix. 
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2. Notation and Assumptions 
2.1. Notation 
Consider an individual who has to make a decision under uncertainty: there is a finite number, n, 
of states of the nature, exactly one of which will occur. Probabilities for the states of nature may but need 
not be known.The restriction to finite states is made for simplicity; the extension to infinite states is 
discussed in Appendix B. There the case of decision under risk is also considered, i.e. the case where 
probabilities are objectively given. The set of states is denoted by S, elements of which are denoted by 
i,j,k. C denotes a set of consequences or outcomes, elements of which are denoted by α,β,γ. The 
individual’s decision problem is to choose between acts. Each act is an n-tuple of outcomes, one for each 
state of the world. Formally, an act is a function from S to C. The set of acts is denoted as F = C 
n
. 
(f1,…,fn) denotes the act which results in outcome fj if state of nature j obtains. By αjf denote the act f with 
fj replaced by α∈C, i.e., αjf = (f1,…,fj−1,α,fj+1,…,fn). 
Let r∈F denote a reference act. Each act can serve as a reference act. Hence, the reference act can 
yield different reference outcomes for different states of nature, which is contrary to most previous 
characterizations of prospect theory in which the reference act yields the same outcome for each state of 
nature. A preference relation ír is defined over F, where f ír g means “f is preferred to g judged from 
reference act r.” The common notation êr is used for strict preference and ~r for indifference; Är and Çr 
denote reversed binary relations.  
A constant act yields the same outcome for each state of nature: act f is constant if there is some α 
∈ C such that f(s) = α for all s∈S. This will be written f = α. Given that outcomes are identified with 
constant acts, the preference relation also applies to outcomes and we can write α ír β in case f ír g with f 
= α and g = β. I will assume that the preference relation over constant acts is independent of the reference 
act and, hence, I will simply write α í β to denote the preference relation over outcomes. The assumption 
that the preference relation over outcomes is reference-independent seems plausible for outcomes that are 
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one-dimensional such as money amounts and life duration. For multi-dimensional outcomes the 
assumption is less obvious. 
 
2.2. Preference conditions 
 As has been mentioned in the introduction, if the reference act always belongs to the decision 
maker’s opportunity set, then it follows from the revealed preference paradigm that the preference relation 
ír cannot be complete. If r is the reference act and r is preferred to both f and g then the preference 
between f and g judged from reference act r cannot be observed. On the other hand, if at least one of the 
acts f and g is at least as good as the reference act r then a preference between f and g judged from r can be 
observed. Hence, this paper considers a special type of incompleteness: loosely speaking, “above” the 
reference act preferences are complete, but “below” the reference act they do not exist. The next definition 
formalizes the above argument. 
 
Definition 1. For a given reference act r, r-upper completeness holds if (i) r ~r r and (ii) for all f,g∈F, if f 
ír r or g ír r, then either f ír g or g ír f; if r êr f and r êr g then neither f ír g nor g ír f.  
 
Completeness of preferences above the reference act may be too strong. Indecisiveness of the decision 
maker may, for example, lead to some incompleteness of preferences above the reference act. This paper 
does not consider such incompleteness. To handle it, the tools of this paper have to be combined with 
those in Maccheroni (2004), for example, who provided an axiomatic analysis of incompleteness due to 
indecisiveness for non-expected utility. 
For r∈F, let Br be the set of pairs of acts for which, judged from r, a preference can be observed. 
That is, Br = {(f,g)∈F×F: f ír r or g ír r}. State j is nonnull with respect to r if there exist (αjf,f)∈Br such 
that αjf êr f. Intuitively, nonnullness means that a state matters to the decision maker. If the decision 
maker would always be indifferent between αjf and f, judged from r, regardless of α then apparently he 
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does not care what happens under state j. The assumption that there exist at least three states that are 
nonnull with respect to r is crucial for what follows. For convenience, assume throughout that for all r, all 
states are nonnull with respect to r.  
 
Definition 2. Weak monotonicity holds if for all (f,g)∈Br,  fj í gj for all j implies that f ír g.  
 
Weak monotonicity says that for acts f and g for which a preference can be observed from 
reference point r, if for each state the outcome under f is at least as attractive as the outcome under g then f 
is at least as attractive as g judged from r. This seems intuitively plausible.  
 
Definition 3. Solvability holds if for all acts f,g,r, with g ír r and for all states j there exists an outcome α 
such that αjf ~r g.  
 
Solvability is a strong condition that will imply unbounded utility. It may be possible to weaken 
solvability to a restricted form as in Definition 6.12 in Krantz et al. (1971). Most likely this weakening 
would require adding additional assumptions; it is not pursued further in this paper. 
 
2.3. Tradeoff consistency 
 Consider the following two indifferences αjf ~r βjg and γjf ~r δjg and let rj = μ. The interpretation 
of these two indifferences is that judged from μ receiving α instead of β is an equally good tradeoff as 
receiving γ instead of δ, because both exactly offset the receipt of gi instead of fi for all states i distinct 
from j. We may say that these indifferences imply that the strength of preference of α over β is equal to 
the strength of preference of γ over δ. Let us now formalize the above interpretation. For outcomes α,β,γ,δ 
write  
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αβ ~*μ γδ 
 
if there exist acts f and g and a reference act r with rj = μ such that  
 
αjf ~r βjg and γjf ~r δjg. 
 
Note that even though the ~*μ relations may be interpreted as measuring strength of preferences, they are 
entirely defined in terms of observable choices and do not rely on unobservable subjective judgments. 
More detailed discussions of relations that are similar to the ~*μ relations can be found in Köbberling and 
Wakker 2003; 2004).  
To be interpretable as strength of preference relations, the ~*μ  relations must be “well-behaved”: 
when the strength of preference of α over β is equal to the strength of preference of γ over δ and also to 
the strength of preference of γ over δ′ then δ and δ′ should be equally attractive.  The next condition 
formalizes this intuition.  
 
Definition 4. Tradeoff consistency holds if improving an outcome in any ~*μ relationship breaks that 
relationship. That is, if αβ ~*μ γδ and αβ ~*μ γδ′ both hold then we must have δ ~ δ′.  
 
Tradeoff consistency is a central condition in the derivation of the results of this paper. It ensures 
two things, first that the preference relations ír have additive representations and, second, that the utility 
functions for different states can be taken proportional. 
An important advantage of using tradeoff consistency as a condition in axiomatizations, besides 
its intuitive appeal, is that it is easily tested empirically. Measurements of utility by the tradeoff method 
(Wakker and Deneffe 1996) provide direct tests of tradeoff consistency. Many empirical studies have used 
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the tradeoff method to measure utility and to test the validity of decision models in decision under 
uncertainty, showing that such measurements are feasible and easily performed (e.g. Abdellaoui 2000, 
Abdellaoui et al. 2005, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2005, Etchart-Vincent 2004, 
Fennema and van Assen 1999). 
I finally introduce some conditions of a technical nature. Consider the order topology on C, which 
is generated by the sets {α∈C: α ê β} and {α∈C: α Ä β}, where β∈C. Let F be endowed with the 
product topology.  
 
Definition 5. Preference continuity holds if for all acts f and r, the sets {g∈F: g ír f} and {g∈F: g Çr f} 
are closed in F. 
 
A function U is a ratio scale if it can be replaced by a function V if and only if there exists a 
positive σ such that V = σU. A function U is an interval scale if it can be replaced by a function V if and 
only if there exists a positive σ and a real τ such that V = σU + τ. 
 
3. Reference-Dependent Utility 
The section will give preference foundations for a general model of reference-dependent utility 
with incomplete preferences. First, consider the case where the reference act is given, i.e., the case where 
the same reference act is used in different decision contexts. This case corresponds to decision situations 
in which the status quo is taken as the reference act. For a given reference act r,  reference-dependent 
utility (RU) holds for ír if there exist positive subjective probabilities pj that sum to one and a utility 
function U: C×C z IR, such that  
a. (f,g)∈Br iff ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) ≥ 0 or ∑
n
j=1 pjU(gj,rj) ≥ 0 
b. for all (f,g)∈Br, f ír g  iff ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) ≥ ∑
n
j=1 pjU(gj,rj) 
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c. U(rj,rj) = 0 for all j. 
d. for all j∈{1,…,n}, U(⋅, rj) represents ífor every rj: for all α,β ∈ C, U(α,rj) ≥ U(β,rj) iff α 
í β. 
e. U is continuous in its first argument and the range of U is IR. 
 
Theorem 1: Consider a given reference alternative r∈F. Let there be at least three states of nature, which 
are all nonnull with respect to r. The following two statements are equivalent for ír: 
1. The order topology on C is connected, ír is transitive and satisfies r-upper 
completeness, weak monotonicity, solvability, preference continuity, and tradeoff 
consistency. 
2. reference-dependent utitlity holds for ír. Furthermore, the pj are uniquely determined 
and U is a ratio scale. ¸ 
 
The next step is to extend Theorem 1 to {ír: r∈F}, i.e. the case where the reference act can vary 
across decision contexts. As mentioned in the introduction, shifts in the reference point are necessary to 
explain the common deviations from expected utility. The subjective probabilities pj and the utility 
function U(⋅,rj) in Theorem 1 depend on the given reference act r. Without further restrictions the model is 
too general to yield predictions. Hence, new conditions will be imposed that ensure that U(⋅,rj) and the pj’s 
are independent of r. First, r-upper completeness is extended to all r. 
 
Definition 6.  Upper completeness holds if r-upper completeness holds for all r.  
 
It is plausible to assume that an outcome is viewed as less attractive the better is the reference 
point from which it is judged. This assumption corresponds to the utility function U being decreasing in 
 13
its second argument, i.e., for all α,β,δ ∈ C, U(δ,α) ≤ U(δ,β) iff β Ç α. The condition that is introduced 
next implies this.  
 
Definition 7. Reference monotonicity holds when for all acts f and r and for all outcomes α,β,δ, β Ç α iff 
δjf ~αjr αjr implies δjf íβjr βjr.  
 
 The next condition is central in the derivation of Theorem 2 and implies that the subjective 
probabilities pj are independent of the reference act and that we can choose the utility functions U(⋅,rj) 
such that U(⋅,rj) = U(⋅,r′j) for all reference alternatives r and r′ for which rj = r′j. 
 
Definition 8. Neutral independence holds if for all f,g ∈ F and for all α,β ∈ C, αjf ~αjr αjg implies βjf ~βjr 
βjg.  
 
Neutral independence says that indifferences are not affected when an outcome under a given 
state that is the same both for the acts under comparison and for the reference act is changed into another 
common outcome. Alternatively stated, if for a given state there are no deviations from the reference point 
then these “no-deviations” are ignored in indifference judgments, regardless of what the common 
outcomes are.  
We are now in a position to state the extension of Theorem 1 to {ír: r∈F}. Reference-dependent 
utility (RU) holds if RU holds for all ír, if U is decreasing in its second argument, and if the subjective 
probabilities pj and the utility function U are independent of the reference act r. 
 
Theorem 2: Let there be at least three states of nature, which are all nonnull with respect to every r∈F. 
The following two statements are equivalent for {ír: r∈F}: 
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1. The order topology on C is connected, ír is transitive and satisfies upper completeness, weak 
monotonicity, reference monotonicity, solvability, preference continuity, tradeoff consistency, 
and neutral independence. 
2. Reference-dependent utility holds. Furthermore, the pj are uniquely determined and U is a ratio 
scale. 
¸ 
 
4. Separating “Normative Utility” and “Psychological Utility” 
 Next a special case of RU will be derived in which the utility function U can be decomposed as  
 
U(fj,rj) = F(u(fj) − u(rj)),        (1) 
 
with u:Cz— continuous and F continuous and strictly increasing and F(0) = 0. Moreover, u is an interval 
scale and F is a ratio scale. 
In this decomposition, u is a basic utility function (Köbberling and Wakker 2005), which 
expresses the individual’s attitude towards outcomes. The basic utility function is reference-independent 
and may be interpreted as the normative component of utility. The function F models the impact of 
additional psychological factors, such as numerical sensitivity and loss aversion. Hence, (1) separates 
normative and psychological utility. Köszegi and Rabin (forthcoming) called F a “universal gain-loss 
function.” Sugden (2003) referred to (1) as a satisfaction-change decomposition and showed that it can 
account for several important empirical deviations from expected utility. Fishburn (1992, Theorem 2) 
proposed a slightly more general model for additive skew-symmetric nontransitive preferences, in which 
the functions F and u are state-dependent.  
 To derive (1) two new conditions must be imposed. Suppose that α ê β ê γ and that U(α,β) = 
U(κ,λ) and U(β,γ) = U(λ,μ). That is, the gain of getting α instead of β is as attractive as the gain of getting 
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κ instead of λ and the gain of getting β instead of γ is as attractive as the gain of getting λ instead of 
μ. Then it seems plausible that the gain of getting α instead of γ should also be equally attractive as the 
gain of getting κ instead of μ. That is, αγ, the “concatenation” of the preference intervals αβ and 
βγ, should match κμ, the concatenation of the preference intervals κλ and λμ, in the sense that the gain of 
getting α instead of γ is as attractive as the gain of getting κ instead of μ. The next condition ensures this.  
 
Definition 9. The concatenation condition holds if for all j, if αjf ~βjr βjr, κjf ~λjr λjr, βjg ~γjr γjr, κjg ~μjr μjr, 
and αjh ~γjr γjr then also κjh ~μjr μjr.  
 
 The second new condition is of a technical nature and extends preference continuity.  
 
Definition 10. Reference act continuity holds if for all acts f ∈F  the sets {r∈F: f ír r} and {r∈F: f Çr 
r}are both closed in F.  
 
Theorem 3: Let the conditions of Theorem 2 hold. Then the following two statements are equivalent. 
1. the concatenation condition, and reference act continuity hold. 
2. Reference-dependent utility holds with U(fj,rj) = F(u(fj) − u(rj)). ¸  
 
Sugden (2003, Theorem 2) also gave a preference foundation for the decomposition (1). His result is 
less general than Theorem 3. First, Sugden (2003) assumed richness of the state space, which is not 
assumed here. Second, the outcome set is —+ in Sugden (2003), whereas the set of outcomes in this paper 
is more general, being any set whose order topology is connected. This greater generality allows for the 
application of Theorem 3 to qualitative outcomes such as health states, for example. Finally, also for C = 
—+, Sugden’s conditions imply our conditions, but the reverse is not true, as we prove in the appendix. The 
concatenation condition is also easier to test empirically than Sugden’s conditions S3 (gain/loss 
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symmetry) and S4 (gain/loss additivity) because it is entirely defined in terms of indifferences. As 
mentioned before, the main difference with Sugden (2003) is, however, conceptual: if the reference act 
always belongs to the individual’s opportunity set then Sugden’s result cannot be applied because it then 
uses unobservable inputs. 
 
5. Constant Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion is general in (1). For empirical purposes and for applications, it is, however, often 
desirable to restrict loss aversion. Indeed, in most empirical analyses loss aversion is characterized by a 
single parameter (e.g. Bleichrodt et al. 2001, Schmidt and Traub 2002, Pennings and Smidts 2003). 
Preference foundations for this case will be given in this Section. 
Constant loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991) holds if in Theorem 2 U(fj,rj) = u(fj) − u(rj) 
when fj í rj and U(fj,rj) = λ(u(fj) − u(rj)) when fj Ç rj. The parameter λ captures the attitude towards gains 
and losses and can be interpreted as a loss aversion coefficient. Constant loss aversion is the special case 
of Theorem 3 where F is both linear for gains and linear for losses, but may be different for gains than for 
losses. Constant loss aversion models have been proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), Shalev (2000), and Köbberling and Wakker (2005), but none of these papers provided 
preference foundations for constant loss aversion.  
 Consider two acts f and g and suppose that for some state of nature j the outcomes of both acts are 
gains when judged from reference act r. An implication of constant loss aversion is that if rj is changed 
into ρj but the change is such that fj and gj remain gains while for all other states of nature the reference act 
does not change, i.e. ri = ρi for all i≠j, then the preference between f and g is not affected by the change in 
the reference point. Hence, we may say that under constant loss aversion, reference-independence holds 
for gains. Similarly, reference-independence then holds for losses. 
 Let us now formalize the above implication.  
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Definition 11. Reference-independence for gains holds if for all r, for all ρj, for all f,g ∈ Br ∩ Bρjr, and for 
all j, if fj í rj, fj í ρj, gj í rj, and gj í ρj, then f ír g iff f íρjr g. Reference-independence for losses holds if 
for all r, for all ρj, for all f,g ∈ Br ∩ Bρjr and for all j, if, rj ífj, ρj í fj, rj í gj, and ρj í gj, then f ír g iff f íρjr 
g. 
 
The next theorem shows that reference-independence for gains and reference-independence for 
losses are not only necessary for constant loss aversion but also sufficient if we impose these two 
conditions on top of the assumptions of Theorem 3. 
 
Theorem 4. Let the conditions of Theorem 3 hold. Then the following two statements are equivalent.  
1. reference-independence for gains and reference-independence for losses both hold. 
2. constant loss aversion holds. ¸ 
 
6. Conclusion. 
 Prospect theory has emerged as the dominant descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty. A 
crucial difference between prospect theory and expected utility is the existence of a reference point. In 
many decision situations the reference point is one of the acts that are available to the decision maker. 
This paper has argued that, according to the revealed preference paradigm, this requires that reference-
dependent preferences must be incomplete. Existing axiomatic models of prospect theory assume 
complete preferences and, hence, they cannot handle this case. I have proposed a generalization of 
prospect theory in which the reference point is one of the available acts. Hence, the paper extends prospect 
theory to new and empirically realistic decision situations. Two special cases were considered: one model 
that separates the normative and psychological components of utility. This separation seems particularly 
useful for prescriptive applications. The other model is more useful for empirical research and practical 
applications of prospect theory and takes loss aversion as constant and characterized by a single 
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parameter. These two models are able to explain important behavioral deviations from expected utility and 
I hope that the characterizations given in this paper will contribute to the study and applications of 
reference-dependence in economics, operations research, and decision theory. 
 
Appendix: Proofs. 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
 The proof that statement 2 implies statement 1 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. in 
Bleichrodt (2005). The set of ~ equivalence classes of C is homeomorphic to the range of U and, hence, it 
is connected. Suppose that f ír g and g ír h. By parts (a) and (b) of the definition of RU for ír, (f,g)∈Br 
and (g,h)∈Br and, hence, (f,h)∈Br. Transitivity follows from part (b). r-upper completeness follows from 
the definition of Br p and from parts (a) and (c). For (f,g)∈Br, if fj í gj for all j, then because U represents 
preferences over outcomes, U(fj) ≥ U(gj) for all j and thus ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) ≥ ∑
n
j=1 pjU(gj,rj). Because (f,g)∈Br, 
part (b) of the definition of RU for ír implies that f ír g and thus weak monotonicity follows. Solvability 
holds because U(C) = IR . 
Continuity of U in its first argument implies continuity of ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) in the fj’s. Suppose that  
rêr f. Then {g∈F: g Çr f}= «, which is closed. Because V = ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) is continuous, the inverse of V 
of the closed subset [0,z) in IR  is closed. This inverse is {g∈F: g ír r}. If f êr r and V(x) = ∑ nj=1 pjU(fj,rj) = 
c > 0, then by continuity of V, the inverses of V of the closed subsets [0,c] and [c,z) in IR  are both closed. 
These inverses are {g∈F: g Çr f} and {g∈F: g ír f}. Preference continuity follows. 
The derivation of tradeoff consistency is slightly different from the proof of Theorem 3.1. in 
Bleichrodt (2005). If αβ ~ *μ γδ then there exist acts f and g and a state j with rj = μ such that αjf ~r βjg and 
γjf ~r δjg. Hence, pjU(α,μ) + ∑i≠jpiU(fi,ri) = pjU(β,μ) + ∑i≠jpiU(gi,ri) and pjU(γ,μ) + ∑i≠jpiU(fi,ri) = pjU(δ,μ) 
+ ∑i≠jpiU(gi,ri), which together with pj > 0 gives  U(α,μ) − U(β,μ) = U(γ,μ) − U(δ,μ). Suppose we also 
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have αβ ~ *μ γδ′. Τhen there exist acts f′ and g′ and a state k with rk = μ such that αkf′ ~r βkg′ and γkf′ ~r 
δ′jg′. By a similar line of argument as above we obtain U(α,μ) − U(β,μ) = U(γ,μ) − U(δ′,μ). It follows that 
U(δ′,μ) = U(δ,μ) and, because U represents í, δ′ ∼ δ, which establishes tradeoff consistency. 
We now show that statement (1) implies statement (2). Let r∈F. By setting Xj = C for all j, it is 
easily verified that all conditions in statement 1 of Theorem 3.1 in Bleichrodt (2005) are satisfied. Our 
tradeoff consistency condition is in fact a strengthening of the tradeoff consistency condition that is used 
there. It follows that there exist functions Vj: C×CØIR  such that  
a. (f,g)∈Br iff  ∑ nj=1 Vj(fj,rj) ≥ 0 or ∑
n
j=1 Vj(gj,rj) ≥ 0 
b. for all (f,g)∈Br, f ír g  iff ∑ nj=1 Vj(fj,rj) ≥ ∑
n
j=1 Vj(gj,rj) 
c. Vj(rj,rj) = 0 for all j. 
d. for all j∈{1,…,n}, Vj represents í: for all fj,gj ∈C, Vj(fj,rj) ≥ Vj(gj,rj) iff fj í gj. 
e. The Vj are continuous and their range is IR. 
Furthermore, the Vj are joint ratio scales. 
 
 It remains to show that the Vj can be taken proportional. To prove this we need the following 
lemma, which was proved in Bleichrodt (2005). The preference relation satisfies strong monotonicity if 
for all (f,g)∈Br, for all states of nature j, fj í gj and for at least one state of nature i, fi ê gi then f êr g. 
 
LEMMA 1: If ír satisfies transitivity, upper completeness, and weak monotonicity, then tradeoff 
consistency implies strong monotonicity. 
 
LEMMA 2: Assume that the Vj: C×C z IR., j = 1,…,n, are as defined above. Then every Vi is proportional to 
every other Vj. 
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Proof.  Assume that the reference act is such that ri = rj = μ. Let α, β, and γ be arbitrary outcomes with α 
ê γ. By solvability and because there are at least three states which are all nonnull, we can find an act f 
such that γif ~r r. By strong monotonicity (Lemma 1) αif êr r. By solvability and because there are at least 
three states of nature, we can find an outcome δ and an act g such that αif ~r βig and γif ~r δig. Hence, αβ 
~*μ γδ. By strong monotonicity and transitivity it follows that β ê δ. 
The indifference αif ~r βig  implies that 
 
Vi(α,μ) + ∑j≠iVj(fj,rj) = Vi(β,μ) + ∑j≠iVj(gj,rj) 
 
or 
 
Vi(α,μ) − Vi(β,μ) =  ∑j≠iVj(gj,rj) − ∑j≠iVj(fj,rj) 
 
Similarly, the indifference γif ~r δig implies that 
 
Vi(γ,μ) − Vi(δ,μ) =  ∑j≠iVj(gj,rj) − ∑j≠iVj(fj,rj) 
 
Hence, Vi(α,μ) − Vi(β,μ) = Vi(γ,μ) − Vi(δ,μ). 
 
 By solvability and because there are other states than i, we can find acts f′ and g′ such that γjf′ ~r 
δjg′ ~r r. By strong monotonicity, αjf′ êr r and βjg′ êr r. By tradeoff consistency and strong monotonicity, 
it follows that αjf′ ~r βjg′. For suppose that αjf′ Är βjg′. By solvability there exists a β′ such that αjf′ ~r 
β′jg′. By transitivity, β′jg′ Är βjg′, and, hence, by weak monotonicity β′ Ä β. But then we have αβ ~*μ 
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γδ and αβ′ ~*μ γδ but β′L β, which violates tradeoff consistency. αjf′ êr βjg′ is excluded by a similar 
argument. 
 The indifferences αjf′ ~r βjg′ and γjf′ ~r δjg′ imply that 
 
Vj(α,μ) − Vj(β,μ) = Vj(γ,μ) − Vj(δ,μ). 
 
Hence, Vi(α,μ) − Vi(β,μ) = Vi(γ,μ) − Vi(δ,μ) implies Vj(α,μ) − Vj(β,μ) = Vj(γ,μ) − Vj(δ,μ). Hence, 
Vi and Vj order utility equalities the same. Because Vi and Vj both represent í and have range IR., they 
must also order utility differences the same.  This and the fact that the functions Vi and Vj are continuous 
in their first argument on a connected domain implies that Vi and Vj are related by a positive linear 
transformation. They are 0 at μ, hence they are related by a scale factor. The scale factor is positive by 
strong monotonicity. Q.E.D. 
 
By Lemma 2, we have Vj = σjVi with σj > 0 because i and j are nonnull. Because i and j were 
arbitrary it follows that all Vj are proportional. Define U = Vi for some state i and define pj = σj/(∑ nj=1σj). 
Because σi = 1, the denominator exceeds zero. Uniqueness of the pj follows from the uniqueness 
properties of the Vj. Theorem 1 has been established. 
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. 
Assume that statement (2) holds. For transitivity, r-upper completeness, weak monotonicity, solvability, 
preference continuity, and tradeoff consistency, the proof is the same as in Theorem 1. If β Ç α then 
U(δ,β) ≥ U(δ,α) because U is decreasing in its second argument. Hence, δjf ~αjr αjr implies δjf íβjr βjr. 
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Suppose next that δjf ~αjr αjr implies δjf íβjr βjr. Then U(δ,β) ≥ U(δ,α) and it follows that β Ç α because U 
is decreasing in its second argument. Hence, reference monotonicity holds. 
If αjf íαjr αjg then pjU(α,α) + ∑i≠j piU(fi,ri) ≥ pjU(α,α) + ∑i≠j pjU(gi,ri). Because U(α,α) = U(β,β) 
= 0, also pjU(β,β) + ∑i≠j piU(fi,ri) ≥ pjU(β,β) + ∑i≠j pjU(gi,ri) and, thus, βjf íβjr βjg, which establishes 
neutral independence. 
Assume next statement (1). By the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Bleichrodt (2005), there exist 
functions Vj: C × CØIR which are independent of the reference act r such that  
a. (x,y)∈Br iff  ∑ nj=1 Vj(xj,rj) ≥ 0 or ∑
n
j=1 Vj(yj,rj) ≥ 0 
b. for all (x,y)∈Br, x ír y  iff ∑ nj=1 Vj(xj,rj) ≥ ∑
n
j=1 Vj(yj,rj) 
c. Vj(rj,rj) = 0 for all j. 
d. for all j∈{1,…,n}, Vj represents í: for all fj,gj∈C, Vj(fj,rj) ≥ Vj(gj,rj) iff fj í gj. 
e. for all j∈{1,…,n}, Vj is decreasing in its second argument: for all α,β,δ∈C, Vj(δ,β) ≥ 
Vj(δ,α) iff β Ç α. 
f. The Vj are continuous in their first argument and their range is IR. 
Furthermore, the Vj are joint ratio scales. Proportionality of the Vj follows from Lemma 2. As in Theorem 
1, define U = Vi for some state i and define pk = σk/(∑ nj=1σk) for all k. 
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3: 
Throughout the proof we will use the assumption that each act can serve as a reference act without further 
mentioning. That statement (2) implies statement (1) is easily verified. Assume that statement (1) holds. 
Let U be as in Theorem 2. Define í′ on C × C by αβ í′ γδ if U(α,β) ≥ U(γ,δ). í′ is clearly transitive. Let 
α,β∈ C. Let r be an arbitrary reference act with rj = β.  By solvability there exists an act f such that αjf ~r r. 
Hence, U(α,β) is defined for each pair αβ and it follows that í′ is complete. From the definition of U it is 
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further immediately verified that for all α,β∈ C, αα ~′ ββ. We can define a preference relation over C by 
α í β if αβ í′ ββ. Since this implies that U(α,β) ≥ U(β,β) = 0 and, by Theorem 2, U is representing over 
outcomes, it follows that this derived preference relation over outcomes is identical to the preference 
relation over outcomes defined in the main text. 
 
LEMMA 11: For all α,β,γ,δ ∈ C, if αγ í′ βγ then αδ í′ βδ, and if γα í′ γβ then δα í′ δβ. 
 
Proof. This follows immediately from the facts that U(⋅,rj) represents í over outcomes for every rj and that 
U is decreasing in its second argument.   Q.E.D. 
 
LEMMA 12: For all α,β,γ,κ,λ,μ ∈ C, if αβ ~′ κλ and βγ ~′ λμ then αγ ~′ κμ. 
 
Proof.  Suppose that αβ ∼′  κλ and βγ ~′ λμ. Hence, U(α,β) = U(κ,λ) and U(β,γ) = U(λ,μ). Let r ∈ F.  By 
solvability and the fact that there are at least three states of nature, we can find acts f, g, and h such that αjf 
~βjr βjr, βjg ~γjr γjr, and αjh ~γjr γjr. Because U(α,β) = U(κ,λ) and U(β,γ) = U(λ,μ), it follows that κjf ~λjr λjr 
and that λjg ~μjr μjr. By the concatenation condition, it follows that κjh ~μjr μjr. Hence, U(α,γ) = U(κ,μ) and 
thus αγ ∼′ κμ. Q.E.D. 
 
 The following two lemmas would follow easily from continuity of U(α,β). Unfortunately, such 
continuity is not easily established. Continuity of U in each of its variables follows from preference 
continuity and reference act continuity, but that is too weak to obtain these lemmas. Hence, we give 
independent derivations. 
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Because U(α,β) is continuous in each of its variables and because U(α,β) is representing 
preferences over outcomes and is decreasing in its second variable, U(α,β) is  continuous and, 
consequently, í′ is continuous. The following lemma follows straightforwardly from the continuity of U 
and the fact that C is connected. For a proof see Krantz et al. (1971, pp. 309-310) or Wakker (1989, 
Lemma III.3.3). 
 
LEMMA 13: For all α,β,γ,κ,μ ∈ C, κγ í′ αβ í′ μγ implies the existence of a λ with λγ  ~′ αβ and γκ í′ αβ 
í′ γμ implies the existence of a λ with γλ ~′ αβ. 
 
 Let α1 and α0 be two outcomes such that α1 L α0. Let r∈F. By solvability and the fact that there 
are states i≠j, we can find an act  f∈F such that (α1)jf  ~ (α0)jr (α0)jr. We then proceed inductively to define 
αk+1 as  (αk+1)jf  ~ (αk)jr (αk)jr, k = 1, 2,….. By solvability, αk+1 exists. By Theorem 2 we have U(αk+1,αk) = 
U(α1,α0) and thus αk+1αk ~′ α1α0, for all k = 1,…… The sequence α0, α1,….,αk,… is a standard sequence.  
 If α1 ê α0 then U(α1,α0) > 0. Because U(α1,α0) = U(αk+1,αk), U(αk+1,αk) > 0 and αk+1 ê αk. Hence, 
if α1 ê α0 then the standard sequence is increasing: αk+1 ê αk, for all nonnegative integers k. Similarly, if 
α1 Ä α0 then the standard sequence is decreasing: αk+1 Ä αk, for all nonnegative integers k. A standard 
sequence is bounded if there exist β,γ ∈ C with β í αk í γ for all αk in the standard sequence. 
 
LEMMA 14: Every bounded standard sequence is finite. 
 
Proof.  We assume that the standard sequence is increasing. Let {αk}, k∈IN be an infinite standard 
sequence. For j∈IN, let Lj = {β∈C: β Ä αj}. Let L = »Lj. Each Lj is open by assumption, and hence L is 
open. L is clearly nonempty, for example α1 is in L. Let β ∈ −L. Then β í αk for all k∈IN. Because αk+1αk 
~′ α1α0 ~′ αkαk−1. We have by transitivity αk+1αk ~′ αkαk−1. Similarly, we obtain αkαk−1 ~′ αk−1αk−2. By 
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Lemma 12, αk+1αk−1 ~′ αkαk−2. Repeatedly using Lemma 12, we obtain αk+1α1 ~′ αkα0. The preference αk+1 
ê αk implies by Lemma 11 that αk+1α0 ê′ αkα0. By transitivity, αk+1α0 ê′ αk+1α1. By Lemma 11, βα0 ê′ 
βα1. 
 Hence, we have βα0 ê′ βα1 í′ αk+1α1 ~′ αkα0. By Lemma 13, there exists a γ∈C such that γα0 ~′ 
βα1. γ is also in −L because γα0 í′ αkα0 and hence γ í αk, for all k∈IN. Because by transitivity βα0 ê′ γα0, 
β ê γ. Thus, {α∈C: α ê γ} is an open subset of C that contains β and is included in −B. Hence, −B is open 
because it is the union of open sets. Because C is connected it cannot be the union of two disjoint open 
sets. Because L is open and nonempty, −L must be empty. Hence, if a standard sequence is infinite then it 
cannot be bounded above. A similar proof shows that an infinite standard sequence cannot be bounded 
below. In other words, any bounded standard sequence must be finite.   Q.E.D. 
 
 The above results establish that í′ satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 1 in Köbberling (2006). 
Her definition of solvability follows from Lemma 13, Archimedeanity follows from Lemma 14, her 
definition of weak separability follows from Lemma 11, and weak ordering of í′ and neutrality were 
established in the text above Lemma 11. Her definition of the concatenation condition follows from 
Lemma 12. Theorem 1 in Köbberling (2006) ensures that there exists an u: CØIR such that for all 
α,β,γ,δ∈C, αβ í′ γδ iff u(α) − u(β) ≥ u(γ) − u(δ), with u unique up to positive linear transformations. 
Hence, by the definition of í′, U(α,β) ≥ U(γ,δ) iff u(α) − u(β) ≥ u(γ) − u(δ). Because C is connected and 
í′ is continuous, we obtain that u is continuous by the proof of Theorem 5.3 in Wakker (1988). 
Because there are nonnull states of nature, it follows that Δ[u] = {u(α) − u(β): α,β∈C} is 
nondegenerate. For all α,β∈C, define F on Δ[u] by F(u(α) − u(β)) = U(α,β). F is clearly strictly 
increasing. Because u is continuous, u(α) − u(β) is continuous both in α and in β and represents 
preferences over outcomes, u(α) − u(β) is continuous.  Because u(α) − u(β) and U are continuous real-
valued functions on connected topological spaces and F is strictly increasing, we obtain by Theorem 2.1 in 
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Wakker (1991) that F is continuous. Because U(α,α) = 0, it follows that F(0) = 0. The uniqueness 
properties of F follow from the uniqueness properties of u and U. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.  
 
Proof that Sugden’s (2003) conditions imply the conditions in Theorem 3 
We finally show that Sugden (2003) conditions imply the conditions of Theorem 3. For ease of 
comparison with Sugden (2003) we express the derivations in terms of U. Reference-act continuity 
follows from his condition S2 (consequence-space continuity). Suppose that βÇα. Because U represents 
preferences over outcomes, for all δ∈C, U(α,δ) ≥ U(β,δ). By Sugden’s S3 (gain/loss symmetry), U(δ,β) ≥ 
U(δ,α). If U(δ,β) ≥ U(δ,α) then by S3, U(α,δ) ≥ U(β,δ) and, hence, β Ç α because U represents 
preferences over outcomes. 
Sugden’s condition S4 (gain/loss additivity) is equivalent to the strong crossover condition in 
difference measurement (Suppes and Winet 1955, Scott and Suppes 1958, Debreu 1958, Pfanzagl 1968). 
Köbberling (2006) showed that the strong crossover condition implies the concatenation condition. She 
also showed that the reverse implication does not hold (p. 390).  
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 4. 
That statement (2) implies statement (1) is easily verified. Assume that statement (1) holds. An element 
α∈C is maximal if for all β∈C, αíβ. An element α∈C is minimal if for all β∈C, αÇβ. It follows 
immediately from U being unbounded that 
 
LEMMA 15: C contains no maximal or minimal elements. 
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Let r∈F. Let fi ê ri, fj ê rj, fk = rk, k≠i,j. Such an act f can be constructed by Lemma 15. By strong 
monotonicity, f êr r. Select γ such that fi ê γ ê ri. Such a γ exists by connectedness of the order topology. 
By solvability, there exists an outcome δ such that γiδjr ~r f. By strong monotonicity δ ê fj. Let g = γiδjr. 
Let r′j = rj for all j≠i, and let r′i Ä ri. By Lemma 15, r′ can be constructed. Because fi êgi = γ ê ri ê r′i
, by reference-independence for gains we obtain f ~r′ g. The indifference f ~r g gives by Theorem 3 and 
cancellation of common terms: 
 
piF(u(fi) − u(ri)) + pjF(u(fj) − u(rj)) = piF(u(γ) − u(ri)) + pjF(u(δ) − u(rj)) 
 
The indifference f ~r′ g gives by Theorem 3 and cancellation of common terms: 
 
piF(u(fi) − u(r′i)) + pjF(u(fj) − u(rj)) = piF(u(γ) − u(r′i)) + pjF(u(δ) − u(rj)). 
 
Let x = u(fi) − u(ri), y = u(γ) − u(ri), and ε = u(ri) − u(r′i). Then the above two equalities yield after 
some rearranging: F(x) − F(y) = F(x+ε) − F(y+ε). Because u(C) = IR and because the above preferences 
can be constructed for all x,y, and ε thanks to solvability, F(x) − F(y) = F(x+ε) − F(y+ε) holds for all x, y, 
and ε and, hence, F must be linear: F(x) = ax + b. Since F is increasing, a > 0 and since F(0) = 0, b = 0.  
A similar line of argument shows that F = bx for losses, i.e. x < 0. We can rescale utility such that 
a = 1. It then follows that λ = ba  and constant loss aversion results. 
¸ 
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Appendix B:  Extension to Infinite State Spaces and to Decision under Risk 
 Let S be a general state space endowed with an algebra whose elements are called events. An act 
is a finite-valued function from S to C, where the inverse of each outcome is an event. Acts are denoted 
by (E1:f1,….,En:fn) meaning outcome fj is received if event Ej obtains with the Ejs partitioning S. 
 First consider a fixed partition of S. This fixed partition is isomorphic to the sets studied before 
and, hence, all theorems derived before can be applied. The representations can be made to coincide on all 
finite partitions by choosing a common normalization of utility, a common refinement for each pair of 
partitions, and applying the uniqueness results of Theorems 1 and 2. Because every pair of acts is 
measurable with respect to a sufficiently fine partition, one representation is obtained for the preferences 
between all acts. 
 The ~*μ relations depend on the partitions chosen and should formally be related to these. 
However, choosing common refinements of partitions reveals that these dependencies can be omitted and 
~*μ relations can be defined as the union of all corresponding partition-dependent ~
*
μ relations. Tradeoff 
consistency can then be defined with respect to the partition-independent ~*μ relation thus defined. 
Extensions to acts with infinitely many outcomes can be obtained through the techniques of Wakker 
(1993b). 
 
Decision under Risk 
 In the case of decision under risk preferences are defined over prospects (p1:f1,…,pn:fn) giving 
outcome fj with probability pj. The probabilities pj are objectively given and are not derived from 
preferences. To relate decision under risk to decision under uncertainty, take the interval [0,1] as state 
space with events being subintervals. Probabilities correspond to lengths of intervals. Each act then 
generates a prospect over the outcomes and preferences over acts determine preferences over prospects. 
Because a prospect can be generated by different acts, acts that generate the same probability distribution 
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over outcomes must be indifferent. In this manner, the results above can also be applied to give preference 
foundations for decision under risk. 
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